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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

18 February 1960

## KHRUSHCHEV'S PRE-SUMMIT MANEUVERS

b3 During the recent meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow, a concerted line of action was developed for the pre-summit period. Khrushchev put forward a number of new moves to be undertaken by the East Germans in an effort to strengthen his position in pressing the West for a German peace treaty and all-German negotiations. He suggested a new formula for concluding two basically similar peace treaties, one between the West and Bonn and the other between the bloc and East Germany.

This variation was outlined publicly by East German Premier Grotewohl on 10 February. He explained that "both peace treaties" would be basically of the same content, settle the same problems, and "lead to the same results." He added that "such a procedure would do away with the objections which are being raised by some governments" to concluding a peace treaty with both German states. Pravda on 11 February emphasized these aspects of Grotewohl's speech.

Khrushchev reportedly plans to elaborate on this formula at the summit conference and again to urge negotiations on the principles of a peace treaty, which could then be amplified, possibly in a four-power commission. East German party boss Ulbricht's public suggestions along these lines on 7 February were reportedly made at Khrushchev's request to set the stage for introducing the subject at the summit as an East German initiative.

Khrushchev and Ulbricht

b3 [redacted] have agreed on a peace treaty which would legalize the division of Germany and would be one of their basic objectives in forthcoming summit talks. Ulbricht reported to his staff after his return from Moscow that Khrushchev will make no basic concessions on Germany or Berlin but will urge that the Western powers persuade the Bonn government to begin negotiations with East Germany.

b1, b3 [redacted] Defending his proposal for creating a free city in West Berlin, Khrushchev termed his offer of such an interim settlement a "real concession" to facilitate all-German talks. He emphatically rejected extension of the free city to include East Berlin. In discussing the terms of an interim solution for Berlin, the Soviet leader mentioned a reduction of troops to a symbolic level and control of hostile propaganda --two of the key points of the Soviet proposal at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference.

Khrushchev appears to have reinforced his threat to conclude a separate treaty with East Germany.

b1, b3 [redacted] Khrushchev carefully avoided tying unilateral action on a peace treaty to the May conference.

Moscow has moved to gain the adherence of nonbloc powers to a separate peace treaty with East Germany. During Soviet President Voroshilov's visit to

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India, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov pressed Nehru for recognition of East Germany,

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63 [REDACTED] Moscow is also approaching Cambodia and possibly other neutralist countries on this question.

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63 [REDACTED] Moscow recently had indirectly sounded out Bangkok.

Disarmament

63 [REDACTED] Khrushchev rejected any link between a German settlement and disarmament. The Soviet premier speculated that disarmament talks might last for four years, and that the USSR would not accept a postponement of a German settlement. He indicated willingness to begin with either nuclear or conventional disarmament or both and referred to Soviet bloc proposals to accept controls and limitations on armaments within a specific zone in Europe.

Poland has sought this past week to maintain pressure on West Germany to accept all-German negotiations on armament limitations in Germany by tying cutbacks in its forces to a reduction in West German forces. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki on 16 February declared that Poland would follow the Soviet Union's example and reduce its

armed forces only if West Germany would do likewise.

Charging that the Adenauer government has chosen the road leading to war, Rapacki said that Poland's defense effort depends on the scale of West German armament. He reiterated that the "German issue" is the main international problem in East-West relations and remains the key subject in Polish foreign policy.

Touching briefly on the Warsaw Pact conference in Moscow two weeks ago, Rapacki said discussions on means of easing international tensions and furthering peaceful coexistence took precedence over defense matters.

West German Position

In a speech at Cologne on 15 February, West German Chancellor Adenauer made his strongest public appeal to date for Western firmness in regard to the issue of Berlin. He said the "crucial" factor was whether the free nations, "above all the United States," will abide by their "word." Declaring he had used such strong language purposefully, Adenauer added that to give in on the Berlin issue would be "the end."

He reiterated his stand of recent weeks that Germany, like other nations, should be granted the right of "self-determination."

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